[John Tyler Connoley,
Sunday January 8, 2006 at 4:43pm]
Retribution and Death
Both people who commented on my post on redemption and the death penalty asked about justice for the victims (and for society). The real issue here, I think, is retribution. Doesn't justice require a retribution equal to the value of the crime?
A year ago, I would have poo-pooed these comments, and probably said the commentors were just confusing vengeance and justice. But, thanks in part to Eugene Volokh, I have come to realize retribution is a legitimate part of the justice equation. As Volokh and Mark Kleiman point out, rehabilitation and deterrence are not sufficient in-and-of themselves, and are often not even part of the justice equation (as in the continued hunt for Nazi criminals sixty years after the fact, when the criminals are no longer a threat and their punishment would in no way deter future war criminals).
Volokh, I think, takes retribution too far by advocating torture and death for certain crimes. He doesn't believe justice is served by essentially euthenizing a violent murderer in the same way we would put down a cat. He thinks certain crimes require a slow painful death. (If you follow the link, you'll find he moderated this opinion, but only because he thought torture would be difficult to implement in our current justice system.)
Although Volokh's opinion is extreme, his reasoning is (as always) carefully thought out, and thereby illustrates one of the main difficulties with retributive justice. How do we determine what counts as retributive? Must the punishment be exactly equal to the crime?
I would argue that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a sufficiently retributive punishment for murder. I'm not arguing for a European-style system in which murderers get ten years in prison. I simply don't think murder demands a state-sanctioned killing, any more than rape would require a retributive rape for justice to be served.
And, as I said in my previous post, I believe leaving open the possibility of redemption is much more important than a tit-for-tat response to crime. Retribution and restoration should both be goals of justice, even if they can't always be achieved in every case. The death penalty may serve retribution, but I don't see how it allows for restoration, and life without parole can serve both goals.
A year ago, I would have poo-pooed these comments, and probably said the commentors were just confusing vengeance and justice. But, thanks in part to Eugene Volokh, I have come to realize retribution is a legitimate part of the justice equation. As Volokh and Mark Kleiman point out, rehabilitation and deterrence are not sufficient in-and-of themselves, and are often not even part of the justice equation (as in the continued hunt for Nazi criminals sixty years after the fact, when the criminals are no longer a threat and their punishment would in no way deter future war criminals).
Volokh, I think, takes retribution too far by advocating torture and death for certain crimes. He doesn't believe justice is served by essentially euthenizing a violent murderer in the same way we would put down a cat. He thinks certain crimes require a slow painful death. (If you follow the link, you'll find he moderated this opinion, but only because he thought torture would be difficult to implement in our current justice system.)
Although Volokh's opinion is extreme, his reasoning is (as always) carefully thought out, and thereby illustrates one of the main difficulties with retributive justice. How do we determine what counts as retributive? Must the punishment be exactly equal to the crime?
I would argue that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a sufficiently retributive punishment for murder. I'm not arguing for a European-style system in which murderers get ten years in prison. I simply don't think murder demands a state-sanctioned killing, any more than rape would require a retributive rape for justice to be served.
And, as I said in my previous post, I believe leaving open the possibility of redemption is much more important than a tit-for-tat response to crime. Retribution and restoration should both be goals of justice, even if they can't always be achieved in every case. The death penalty may serve retribution, but I don't see how it allows for restoration, and life without parole can serve both goals.